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a b s t r a c t
We describe a type system for the Xdpi calculus of Gardner and Maffeis. An Xdpi-network
is a network of locations, where each location consists of both a data tree (which contains
scripts and pointers to nodes in trees at different locations) and a process, for modeling
process interaction, process migration and interaction between processes and data. Our
type system is based on types for locations, data and processes, expressing security levels.
A tree can store data of different security level, independently from the security level of the
enclosing location. The access and mobility rights of a process depend on the security level
of the “source” location of the process itself, i.e. of the location where the process was in
the initial network or where the process was created by the activation of a script. The type
system enjoys type preservation under reduction (subject reduction). In consequence of
subject reductionwe prove the following security properties. In awell-typed Xdpi-network,
a process P whose source location is of level h can copy data of security level at most h and
update data of security level less than h. Moreover, the process P can only communicate
data and go to locations of security level equal or less than h.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Information systems have evolved into open distributed systems that include decentralized peer-to-peer networks. An
essential role of such systems is management of data, which appear to be semi-structured and distributed. Data-sharing
applications require the integration of mobile processes and semi-structured data.
As information networks become more open and dynamic, the need for security and privacy grows stronger. Systems
must be able to exchange data and processes while preserving security. One solution is to ground them on typed models. In
such models, a well-typed network must reduce only to well-typed networks, assuring access and movement rights.
In this paper we propose a type system for the Xdpi calculus [9]. An Xdpi-network is a network of locations, where each lo-
cation consists of both a data tree and a running process, formodeling process interaction, processmigration and interaction
between processes and data. The leaves of data trees contain pointers to nodes in trees of different locations, and scripts, i.e.
static processes, which can be activated. In turn, scripts, pointers and trees can occur inside scripts and running processes.
In addition to the original syntax, we decorate location names with security levels taken from a partially ordered set of
security levels with a bottom element. Therefore, a location in a well-formed network will be of the shape:
lh[ T ‖ P ]
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where l is a location name, h is its security level, T is a tree of data and P is a running process. Pointers, scripts and running
processes are assigned security levels by means of a typing system.
The access and mobility rights of a process depend on the security level of the “source” location of the process itself,
i.e. of the location where the process was in the initial network or where the process was created by the activation of a
script. Hence, in a well-typed network each process has the security level of its source location. Security levels of scripts and
pointers in trees, however, don’t depend on the level of the enclosing location.
Processes migrate thanks to the go command. The go command can only move a process from one location to a location
of security level lower than or equal to the level of the process itself. Processes can also communicate data via channels. The
security levels of the communicated data will never exceed the security level of the process.
Running processes can activate scripts in the local tree by the command runp, where p is a path expressionwhich identifies
a set of nodes. In a well-typed network a scripted process can be activated only if its security level is at most the one of the
enclosing location.
Running processes can also modify the local tree and use the information in that tree by means of the command update.
All trees can be copied by all processes, but only trees containing no data can be deleted and possibly replaced. A process of
security level h can only read data of security level at most h, andmodify data of security level less than h. The only exception
being that processes generated by activating scripts canmodify scripts of the same security level and identified by the same
path in trees.
An important feature of the Xdpi calculus is the fact that a script can dynamically create links to the location where it
is activated. On the one hand this is a desirable feature of mobile processes; for instance, to allow a process to return to
the activating location. On the other hand it increases the complexity of the typing system. Indeed, we need to distinguish
processes that contain unresolved references to their activating location (these processes only make sense as “dormant”
scripts) from processes where all pointers are absolute, that are the only processes that are allowed to be actively running.
RelatedWork The Xdpi calculus [9,14] models both localized, mobile processes and distributed, dynamic, semi-structured
data, allowing to represent data-sharing applications. It can be seen as an extension of the Active XML model [1].
The locations and the processes of Xdpi are essentially those of dpi [10] enriched with capabilities for data manipulation.
The only difference is that a process in dpi canmigrate to a location independently from the existence of the location itself in
the current network, while in Xdpi such an existence is a necessary condition for migration. The data trees of Xdpi are related
to those in [2,4] and the treatment of shared distributed data is inspired by [19].We refer to [9] for further references related
to the calculus design.
Many type systems controlling the use of resources and the mobility of processes have been proposed for the dpi
calculus [10] and for related calculi [16,6,5]. The types discussed here are essentially inspired by the security types checking
access rights for pi-calculus of [11]. For simplicity we do not distinguish between reading and mobility rights, but our type
system can be extended to take them into account. For the purpose of the present paper it is enough to consider elements
of a partially ordered set with a bottom element as security levels instead of elements of a lattice as usual [20], this choice
being justified by the fact that we do not use meets and joins. We formalize the network properties assured by our type
system using the notions of network invariant and initial network as in [3].
The present paper is an expanded and revised version of [8], the main differences being:
• the data in trees can be of different security levels and do not depend on the security level of the enclosing location, while
in [8] each location was only allowed to contain data of at most the security level of the location itself;
• the communication, copying, updating andmobility rights of processes only depend on their source location, while in [8]
theywere depending on the enclosing location, but for the possibility of processes tomove back to their source locations.
Minor differences are:
• the capability of modifying data requires a higher security level than the capability of reading data, while in [8] there was
no difference;
• in order to take into account the new fine-grained security labeling of data trees there is a special type for data-less trees,
i.e. trees whose leaves contain no data, because only data-less trees can be deleted or replaced (they can be considered
garbage).
Outline of the paper. Sections 2 and 3 introduce the syntax, the reduction rules, and the typing rules of typed Xdpi, exemplified
by the examples in Section 5. The properties of the calculus are discussed in Section 4 and proved in Appendices B and C.
Section 6 contains a few final remarks.
2. Syntax and operational semantics
The Xdpi calculus we consider here is essentially the calculus introduced in [9], with a few important differences.
The main difference between the original Xdpi and the present one is the use of a typed syntax. We decorate the location
names with security levels and the channel names with value types. (An alternative approach could avoid these decorations
by fixing an environment for locations and channels.)
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Table 1
Syntax of networks
N ::= 0 | N | N | lh[T ‖ P] | (νcTv)N
Table 2
Syntax of trees
T ::= ∅ empty rooted tree
| x tree variable
| T | T composition of trees, joining the roots
| a[T] edge labeled awith subtree T
| a[Π ] edge labeled awith scriptΠ
| a[p@λ] edge labeled awith pointer p@λ
Table 3
Syntax of paths
p ::= a | // | .. | • | x | p / p
More importantly, the syntax includes a typed matching function instead of an untyped one. Pattern matching needs to
take types into account, in order to have type preservation under reduction. We will explain and motivate this choice at the
end of the section.
In order to simplify the syntax we only allow monadic instead of polyadic communication and we do not distinguish
between public channels (which cannot be restricted) and session channels (whichmust be restricted in the scripts).1 These
features of the original Xdpi can be easily handled by our type system.
2.1. Syntax
Networks. A network is a parallel composition ( | ) of locations consisting of a tree and a process, where processes at
different locations can share communication channels. In a well-formed network the locations have different names. The
syntax of networks is given in Table 1. We use l,m to range over location names, and h, i, j over security levels. The location
lh[ T ‖ P ] is well-formed if both the tree T and the process P do not contain occurrences of free variables. We use c to range
over channel names and Tv to denote a value type as defined in Table 9. The binder ν is, as usual, the restriction operator.
Trees. The data model is an unordered edge-labeled rooted tree with leaves containing empty trees, scripts and pointers.
The syntax of trees is presented in Table 2, using a to denote an edge label.
A script is a static process embedded in a tree that can be activated by a process from the same location. We use Π to
range over processes and variables, and a script is denoted by Π .
A path identifies nodes in a tree. Table 3 gives the formation rules of paths, using p to range over paths. In a path, “a”
denotes a step along an edge a, “ // ” denotes any node, “..” a step back, “• ” the path from the root to the current node, “x” a
variable and “/ ” the path composition. We will say that a path is a local path if it contains “• ”.2 Local paths are only allowed
to be present inside scripts. The string “• ” is replaced by the actual path of the location of the script at the moment in which
the script is activated.
We use λ to range over variables and location names super-scripted by security levels. A pointer p@λ refers to the set of
nodes identified by the path p in the tree at location λ.
Processes. The processes that we are concerned with are essentially dpi-calculus processes [10], where the local
communication modeled by pi-calculus processes [15,21] is extended with migration between locations (command go).
There are two more commands for local communication between processes and data: one for updating (copy, paste, cut,
etc.) the data tree (update) and the other one that activates the execution of scripts that are embedded in local data tree
(run). We use P,Q, R to range over processes, and γ to range over channel names (decorated by value types) and variables.
The syntax of processes is given in Table 4.
A value is either a channel name super-scriptedwith a value type, a script, a location name super-scriptedwith a security
level, a path or a tree. Using v to range over values, the syntax of values is given in Table 5.
The argument of go is a location name (super-scripted with a security level) or a variable, or the symbol “	”, which can
only occur in scripts to denote the location where the script will be activated.
The two arguments of the update command are, respectively, a pattern χ and a data term V , whose syntax is given in
Table 6. A pattern is either a script pattern, or a pointer pattern, or a data-less tree variable, or a tree variable. In a pointer
1 The distinction between public and session channels is important for implementation since otherwise one needs to alpha-convert the whole data tree
of a location when a process, restricting a channel name, migrates.
2 The path syntax allows also meaningless paths, like “• / • / • ”: this could be clearly avoided either by typing or by refining the syntax.
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Table 4
Syntax of processes
P ::= 0 the nil process
| P | P composition of processes
| (νcTv)P declare new channel name c transmitting values of type Tv
| γ¯〈v〉 output value v on a channel γ
| γ(x).P input parametrised by a variable x
| !γ(x).P replication of an input process
| go λ.P migrate to location λ, continue as P
| go	.P migrate to the source location, continue as P
| runp run the processes identified by the path expression p
| updatep(χ, V).P update command
Table 5
Syntax of values
v ::= cTv | P | lh | p | T
Table 6
Syntax of patterns and data terms
χ ::= xj | y?@xj | xDL | x
V ::= Π | p@λ | T
Table 7
Reduction rules
(com) lh[ T || c¯Tv〈v〉 | cTv(z).P | Q ] → lh[ T || P{v/z} | Q ]
(com!) lh[ T || c¯Tv〈v〉 |!cTv(z).P | Q ] → lh[ T || !cTv(z).P | P{v/z} | Q ]
(stay) lh[ T || go lh.P | Q ] → lh[ T || P | Q ]
(go) lh[ T1 || go mj.P | Q ] | mj[ T2 || R ] → lh[ T1 || Q ] | mj[ T2 || P | R ]
(run)
p(T) p,lh,xh,x T, {{P1/x}, . . . , {Pn/x}}
lh[ T || runp | Q ] → lh[ T || P1 | . . . | Pn | Q ]
(update)
p(T) p,lh,χ,V T
′, {s1, . . . ,sn}
lh[ T ‖ updatep(χ, V).P | Q ] → lh[ T′ ‖ Ps1 | . . . | Psn | Q ]
pattern j is a security level and ? ∈ {Local, }3 indicates whether y stands for a local path or for a path without occurrences of
“• ”. Data terms can be scripts, pointers or trees. The need to distinguish generic trees fromdata-less trees (that is treeswhose
leaves are empty) arises from the facts that trees themselves do not have security levels. In order for a process to delete or
replace a tree, it has to have permission to delete all the data contained in the tree first. Then any process, regardless of its
security level, can delete or replace data-less trees.
In updatep(χ, V).P the variables of χ can occur both in V and in P and they are bound. For this reason we allow variable
occurrences in scripts, pointers, trees and processes.
2.2. Reduction rules
The reduction relation describes three forms of interactions:
• processes can communicate with each other within a location (rules (com) and (com!));
• processes can move between locations (rules (stay) and (go));
• process can interact with the local data (rules (update) and (run)).
The reduction relation is the least relation on networks which is closed with respect to structural equivalence, reduction
rules given in Table 7 and reduction contexts, given by
C ::= − | C | N | (νcTv)C.
The standard definition of structural equivalence is presented in Appendix A.
3 Here and in the following we use  to denote the empty string, so we get either yLocal@xj or y@xj .
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Table 8
Definition of the update function 
(Empty tree) ∅ θ ∅,∅
(Script) P θ P,∅
(Pointer) p@lh  θ p@lh,∅
(Node)
U  θ V,Θ
a[U] θ a[V],Θ
(Par)
U1  θ T1,Θ1 U2  θ T2,Θ2
U1|U2  θ T1|T2,Θ1 ∪Θ2
(Id)
match(U,χ) undefined U  θ V,Θ
a[U] θ a[V],Θ
(Up)
match(U,χ) = s Vs θ V′,Θ θ = p, lh,χ, V
a[U] θ a[V′], {s{lh/	, p/• }} ∪Θ
The communication rules (com) and (com!) are from the pi-calculus [15,21]. Processes can communicate only if they are
in the same location.
There are two rules for migration. Rule (go) describes migration to a distinct location. The other rule, (stay), describes
staying at the current location.
In rules (run) and (update) we denote by p(T) the tree T where all the nodes identified by the path p are underlined.When
the node is a leaf we underline its label.
The command runp finds all the scripts in the local tree identified by the path p, by means of the update function . Then
it activates their parallel execution, after replacing “	” and “• ” by the enclosing location and the path p, respectively.
The update command updatep(χ, V).P traversing top-down the local tree finds all the data terms Vk given by the path p and
pattern matches these data terms with χ to obtain substitutions sk when they exist. For each successful pattern matching it
replaces the Vk with Vsk and starts Psk in parallel. The match function, in order to check if a data term agrees with a pattern,
requires not only the data term to be, respectively, a script, a pointer, a data-less tree or a tree, according to the four shapes
of the pattern (as in [9]), but it requires also the data terms to satisfy the type information given by the pattern. This means
that:
(1) if the pattern is xj, then the data term must be a script of level j,
(2) if the pattern is y?@xj, then the data termmust be a pointer in which (i) the path can be a local path only if ? = Local and
(ii) the location must be of level j,
(3) if the pattern is xDL, then the data term must be a data-less tree,
(4) if the pattern is x, then the data term must be a tree.
These conditions are enforced by using the type assignment systemof Section 3. If the typedmatch is successful, the function
returns a substitution which replaces the variables in the pattern by the corresponding data terms. More precisely the
definition of the match function is:
(1) match(P,xj) = {P/x} if ` P : ProcLocal(j);
(2) match(p@lj, y?@xj) = {lj/x, p/y} if ` p : Path?;
(3) match(T, xDL) = {T/x} if ` T : DLTree;
(4) match(T, x) = {T/x} if ` T : Tree.
In principle it would be desirable to avoid security level matching at run time, and rely on static typing only. However in
this setting, static typing would be too restrictive. Data terms in a tree can have any security level, and we cannot statically
know the security levels of data terms found using the path “//”. This is why dynamic checking is necessary.
The reduction rules for update and run are based on the definition of the update function which is parametrised on
p, lh,χ, V . The argument of this function can be either a tree (with some underlined nodes), or a tree label (i.e. a script or a
pointer) possibly underlined: we use U to range over these data terms enriched with underlining. The result is a data term
and a set of substitutions.
Table 8 defines the function . The only interesting rules are (Id) and (Up): we convene that the match function ignores
underlining. If U and χ do not match, then the function  is applied to U, since it could contain other underlined nodes.
When the matching between U and χ gives a substitution s, the data term Vs is updated (notice that the range of s can
contain underlined nodes and then Vs can contain underlined nodes too) obtaining V ′ and the set of substitutionsΘ . Finally
U is replaced bywith V ′ and the substitution s{lh/	, p/• } is added toΘ . This addition is useful when s = {P/x} for solving
the references to the enclosing location and to the current path.
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Table 9
Syntax of types
Ch(Tv) type of channels communicating values of type Tv
Loc(i) type of locations at security level i
Script(i) type of scripts at security level i
Path type of paths, not containing “• ”
PathLocal type of paths, possibly containing “• ”
Pointer(i) type of pointers, not containing local paths, at security level i
PointerLocal(i) type of pointers, possibly containing local paths, at security level i
DLTree type of data-less trees
Tree type of trees, not containing local paths
TreeLocal type of trees, possibly containing local paths
Proc(i) type of processes, not containing local paths, at security level i
ProcLocal(i) type of processes, possibly containing local paths, at security level i
Net type of networks
where i ∈ L and Tv ranges over value types defined by
Tv ::= Ch(Tv) | Loc(i) | Script(i) | Path? | DLTree | Tree?
The definition of substitution we use is standard, with the exception that occurrences of “	” and “• ” inside scripts in
the processes prefixed by the update command are not affected by this substitution. Similarly if s = {T/x}, occurrences of
“	” and “• ” inside scripts in the leaves of T are not affected by this substitution. Concretely, {T/x}{lh/	, p/• } = {T/x} for any
T, x, lh, p.
We denote by χˆ the data term obtained from the pattern χ by erasing the type information:
χˆ =

x if χ = xj,
y@x if χ = y?@xj,
x if χ = xDL or χ = x.
Some special forms of the update command have been already defined in [9]:
cutp(χ).Q := updatep(χ,∅).Q
copyp(χ).Q := updatep(χ, χˆ).Q
pastep〈T〉.Q := updatep(x, x|T).Q where x does not occur in T,Q .
We will freely use these shorthands in the examples.
In Section 5.1 we will show examples of process reductions.
3. Type assignment
The main goals of our type system are to control communication of values, access to data and migration of processes
between locations. We will formally define these notions in Section 4.
We rely on a notion of security levels, and therefore we assume a fixed partial order (L,≤) of security levels with a
bottom⊥. As already said in Section 2 we use h, i, j to range over elements ofL.
The syntax of types is the content of Table 9. Clearly the types correspond to the syntactic categories of the previous
section. We use the suffix Local when we allow local paths. As we said, we need this distinction since a run or an update
command containing a local path as index cannot be executed, and thus it can only appear inside a “dormant” script.
We will use Path? as short for Path or PathLocal and similarly for the other types. When more than one ? appears in a
typing rule we always assume that all of them are replaced either by  or by Local.
We define the security level of a value type (notation |Tv|) as follows:
• |Ch(Tv)| = |Tv|;
• |Loc(i)| = |Script(i)|= i;
• |Path?| = |DLTree| = |Tree?| = ⊥.
An environment Σ gives the association between:
• variables and value types
• variables and local process types
i.e. we define:
Σ := ∅ | Σ, x : Tv | Σ, x : ProcLocal(i).
We use the environment by means of a standard axiom:
(axiom)
Σ, x : σ ` x : σ
where σ ranges over value types and local process types.
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Table 10
Typing of paths
(patha)
Σ ` a : Path
(path//)
Σ ` // : Path
(path..)
Σ ` .. : Path
(path• )
Σ ` • : PathLocal
Σ ` p : Path? Σ ` p′ : Path?
(path/)
Σ ` p / p′ : Path?
Σ ` p : Path
(pathL)
Σ ` p : PathLocal
Table 11
Typing of trees
(treeEmpty)
Σ ` ∅ : DLTree
Σ ` T : Tree?
(treea)
Σ ` a[T] : Tree?
Σ ` T1 : DLTree Σ ` T2 : DLTree
(treeDL|)
Σ ` T1 | T2 : DLTree
Σ ` T : DLTree
(treeDLa)
Σ ` a[T] : DLTree
Σ ` Π : Script(i)
(treeScript)
Σ ` a[Π ] : Tree
Σ ` T1 : Tree? Σ ` T2 : Tree?
(tree|)
Σ ` T1 | T2 : Tree?
Σ ` p@λ : Pointer?(i)
(treePointer)
Σ ` a[p@λ] : Tree?
Σ ` T : DLTree
(treeDL)
Σ ` T : Tree
Σ ` T : Tree
(treeL)
Σ ` T : TreeLocal
Typing rules for channels, locations and scripts are as expected (recall that Π ranges over processes and variables):
(chan)
Σ ` cTv : Ch(Tv) (loc)Σ ` li : Loc(i)
Σ ` Π : Proc?(i)
(script)
Σ ` Π : Script(i)
Typing rules for paths are given in Table 10: a local path always gets the type PathLocal instead of Path.
The typing rule for pointers
Σ ` λ : Loc(i) Σ ` p : Path?
(pointer)
Σ ` p@λ : Pointer?(i)
gives a Pointer or a PointerLocal type according to the path type. The security level of the pointer is the security level of the
pointed location.
Typing rules for trees are given in Table 11. According to these typing rules:
• a tree is data-less, i.e. it has the type DLTree, only if all its leaves are labeled by ∅;
• a tree that has at least one node labeled by a local pointer will be typed by TreeLocal.
Typing rules for processes are given in Table 12. The rule (go) allows a process whose source location is of security level
i to migrate to a location at security level j only if j ≤ i.
In the typing rules for update we assume that χ ∈ {xj, y?@xj, xDL, x}, and we define the environment Σχ for associating
types to the variables bound by the pattern.
Σχ =

x : ProcLocal(j) if χ = xj,
x : Loc(j), y : Path? if χ = y?@xj,
x : DLTree if χ = xDL,
x : Tree if χ = x.
We define the security level of a pattern (notation |χ|) as expected:
• |xj| = |y?@xj| = j;
• |xDL| =|x| = ⊥.
In these rules TPS(j) stands for Tree or Pointer?(j) or Script(j).
The three typing rules for the updating command are necessary since we require:
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Table 12
Typing of processes
(proc0)
Σ ` 0 : Proc?(i)
Σ ` P1 : Proc?(i) Σ ` P2 : Proc?(i)
(proc|)
Σ ` P1 | P2 : Proc?(i)
Σ ` P : Proc?(i) |Tv| ≤ i
(procν)
Σ ` (νcTv)P : Proc?(i)
Σ ` v : Tv Σ ` γ : Ch(Tv) |Tv| ≤ i
(out)
Σ ` γ¯〈v〉 : Proc?(i)
Σ, x : Tv ` P : Proc?(i) Σ ` γ : Ch(Tv) |Tv| ≤ i
(input)
Σ ` γ(x).P : Proc?(i)
Σ, x : Tv ` P : Proc?(i) Σ ` γ : Ch(Tv) |Tv| ≤ i
(!input)
Σ ` !γ(x).P : Proc?(i)
Σ ` P : Proc?(i) Σ ` λ : Loc(j) j ≤ i
(go)
Σ ` go λ.P : Proc?(i)
Σ ` P : Proc?(i)
(goHome)
Σ ` go	.P : ProcLocal(i)
Σ ` p : Path?
(run)
Σ ` runp : Proc?(i)
Σ ` p : Path? Σ ∪ Σχ ` P : Proc?(i) |χ| ≤ i
(copy)
Σ ` updatep(χ, χˆ).P : Proc?(i)
Σ ` p : Path? Σ ∪ Σχ ` P : Proc?(i)
χ 6= x |χ| < i Σχ ` V : TPS(j) j ≤ i
(paste)
Σ ` updatep(χ, V).P : Proc?(i)
Σ, x : ProcLocal(i) ` P : ProcLocal(i)
x : ProcLocal(i) ` V : TPS(j) j ≤ i
(pasteHere)
Σ ` update• (xi, V).P : ProcLocal(i)
• all processes to be allowed to copy all trees and to replace only data-less trees (rules (copy) and (paste));
• processes at the same security level of a leaf to be allowed to copy the leaf (rule (copy));
• processes at a higher security level than a leaf to be allowed to replace the leaf with a data term of a security level not
greater than the security level of the process itself (rule (paste));
• a process script in a leaf to be allowed to replace itself with a data term of a security level not greater than its own security
level (rule (pasteHere)).
As a consequence a process can replace a non-data-less tree only if all the leaves of this tree contain data terms of security
levels lower than the security level of the process itself. For this purpose the process needs first to replace all the leaves
containing pointers and scripts by the empty tree and then to replace the so obtained data-less tree.
Typing rules for networks are given in Table 13. For typing a location in a network we have two typing rules: the initial
rule (netIloc) and the ongoing rule (netOloc). The first rule requires the process to have the same security level of the enclosing
location, while the second one allows a process of any security level. This reflects the requirement that access and mobility
rights of processes depend on their source locations, as we will discuss in Section 4.
The functionN associates to a network the set of its location names:
N (0) = ∅ N (li[ T ‖ P ]) = {l} N (N1 | N2) = N (N1) ∪N (N2).
It is used in rule (net|) to assure that each location name occurs at most once in a typed network.
The system satisfies subject reduction:
Theorem 3.1 (Subject Reduction). Let ` N : Net and N → N′, then ` N′ : Net.
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Table 13
Typing of networks
∅ ` T : Tree ∅ ` P : Proc(i)
(netIloc)
` li[ T ‖ P ] : Net
∅ ` T : Tree ∅ ` P : Proc(j)
(netOloc)
` li[ T ‖ P ] : Net
(net0)
` 0 : Net
` N : Net
(netν)
` (νcTv)N : Net
` N1 : Net ` N2 : Net N (N1) ∩N (N2) = ∅
(net|)
` N1 | N2 : Net
The proof is presented in Appendix B. It uses some Generation and Substitution lemmas which are also presented in
Appendix B.
4. Safety properties
In the present section, using the subject reduction, we can show some relevant properties of typed initial networks. We
say that a network is initialwhen its locations can be typed by means of the initial typing rules.
More meaningful than the subject reduction theorem are the following properties of initial networks4:
P0 a channel in a process whose source location has level h can communicate only values whose security level is less than
or equal to h;
P1 a process whose source location has level h can migrate to a location of level j only if j ≤ h;
P2 a process whose source location has level h can copy from the local tree only data of level jwith j ≤ h;
P3 a process whose source location has level h can modify in the local tree only data of level jwith j < h, unless the process
itself was generated by running a script of security level h in a tree at path p, and in this case it can modify scripts which
are both of the security level h and reachable by the path p;
P4 a script of level jwhich is a leaf of a tree in a location of level i can be activated only if j ≤ i.
In order to discuss these properties we need to formalize the notion of “source” location of a process. Roughly by “source”
location of a process we mean the location where the process was in the initial net or where the process was created by a
run command.
We use _ to denote the reflexive and transitive closure of → and Eν to denote a possibly empty sequence of channel
restrictions. If N is an initial network and N _ Eν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′), then the source location of the process P in this
reduction is defined by induction on the reduction_ and by cases:
• if N ≡ Eν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′), then the source location of P is lh;
• if N _ Eν(lh[ T || runp | Q ′ ] | N′) → Eν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′) since p(T) p,lh,xh,x T, {{R1/x}, . . . , {Rn/x}} and
R1 ≡ P | R and Q ≡ R | R2 | . . . | Rn | Q ′, then the source location of P is lh;
• if N _ Eν(lh[ T ′ || updatep(χ, V).P′ | Q ′ ]|N′) → Eν(lh[ T || P | Q ]|N′) since p(T ′)  p,lh,χ,V T, {s1, . . . ,sn} and P′s1 ≡ P|R and
Q ≡ R| P′s2| . . . | P′sn| Q ′, then the source location of P is the source location of updatep(χ, V).P′ in the reduction without
the last step;
• if N _ Eν(lh[ T || cTv〈v〉 | cTv(z).P′ | Q ′ ] | N′) → Eν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′) and P′{v/z} ≡ P | R and Q ≡ R | Q ′, then the source
location of P is the source location of cTv(z).P′ in the reduction without the last step;
• if N_ Eν(lh[ T ‖ cTv〈v〉 | !cTv(z).P′ | Q ′ ] | N′) → Eν(lh[ T ‖ P | Q ] | N′) and P′{v/z} ≡ P | R and Q ≡ !cTv(z).P′ | R | Q ′, then the
source location of P is the source location of !cTv(z).P′ in the reduction without the last step;
• if N _ Eν(lh[ T || go lh.P′ | Q ′ ] | N′) → Eν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′) and P′ ≡ P | R and Q ≡ R | Q ′, then the source location of P is
the source location of go lh.P′ in the reduction without the last step;
• if N _ Eν(lh[T ‖ Q ′ ] | mj[ T ′ ‖ go lh.P′ | R ] | N′′) → Eν(lh[ T ‖ P | Q ] | N′) and P′ ≡ P | R′ and Q ≡ R′ | Q ′ and
N′ ≡ mj[ T ′ || R ] | N′′, then the source location of P is the source location of go lh.P′ in the reduction without the last step;
• if N _ Eν(lh[ T ′ || P | Q ′ ] | N′′) → Eν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′), then the source location of P is the source location of P in the
reduction without the last step.
4 Notice that P0, P1, P2, P3 and P4 are network invariants in the sense of [3].
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The first two cases are the basic cases, inwhich the process P takes the current location as source location: in the first one the
network is initial, in the second one the process P is generated by the last reduction step. In the last case the reduction does
not modify the process P, which preserves its source location. In all other cases an action prefixing the process P (possibly in
parallel with other processes and/or modulo the substitution of a value for a variable) is consumed and the source location
of P is the source location of the process starting with that action in the reduction without the last step.
We can then formalize the above properties as follows.
Proposition 4.1. If N is an initial network, and N _ Eν(li[ T || P | Q ] | N′), and h is the security level of the source location of P,
then:
P0 P ≡ c¯Tv〈v〉 implies |Tv| ≤ h;
P1 P ≡ go mj.P′ implies j ≤ h;
P2 P ≡ updatep(χ, χˆ).P′ implies |χ| ≤ h;
P3 P ≡ updatep(χ, V).P′ and V 6= χˆ imply either χ 6= x and |χ| < h or χ = xh and P has been generated by activating a script
in a tree at path p;
P4 P ≡ runp implies that the execution of P can only activate scripts at security level i.
Property P4 is an immediate consequence of the reduction rule (run). The remaining properties follow easily observing
that each process has the security level of its source location: see Appendix C for the proof.
Proposition 4.2. If N is an initial network, and N _ Eν(li[ T || P | Q ] | N′), and h is the security level of the source location of P,
then ` P : Proc(h).
5. Examples
We will consider natural numbers with their order as security levels in many of the following examples.
5.1. Examples of process reduction
Let us suppose that P and Q are processes of security level 2 and R is a process of security level 3. If
T ≡ c[b[a[P]] | b[a[Q]] | b[a[R]]]
and p = c/b/a then
p(T) ≡ c[b[a[P]] | b[a[Q]] | b[a[R]]].
(a) If the source location of the process copyc/b/a(x2).P′ is of level 2, then this process will find and copy scripts of level 2.
l2[ c[b[a[P]] | b[a[Q]] | b[a[R]]] || copyc/b/a(x2).P′] →
l2[ c[b[a[P]] | b[a[Q]] | b[a[R]]] || P′{P/x} | P′{Q/x}].
(b) If the source location of the process updatec/b/a(x2,∅).R′ is of level 3, then the scripted processes of level 2 in the tree
can even be modified.
l2[ c[b[a[P]] | b[a[Q]] | b[a[R]]] || updatec/b/a(x2,∅).R′] →
l2[ c[b[a[∅]] | b[a[∅]] | b[a[R]]] || R′{P/x} | R′{Q/x}].
(c) The activation of the processQ ≡ update• (x2,∅).update//(xDL, T1).0 of level 2 canmodify the scripts of level 2 identified
by the same path as the script Q . In this way starting from the tree c[b[a[P]] | b[a[Q]]] a data-less tree is obtained
and it is replaced by the tree T1.
l2[ c[b[a[P]] | b[a[Q]]] || runc/b/a] →
l2[ c[b[a[P]] | b[a[Q]]] || P | updatec/b/a(x2,∅).update//(xDL, T1).0] →
l2[ c[b[a[∅]] | b[a[∅]]] || P | update//(xDL, T1).0] →
l2[ c[T1] || P].
Instead, if the initial tree contains also a script of level 3 that script cannot be activated and it cannot be modified by Q .
Therefore, the final replacement does not involve the subtree containing that script.
l2[ c[b[a[P]] | b[a[Q]] | b[a[R]]] || runc/b/a] →
l2[c[b[a[P]]|b[a[Q]]|b[a[R]]]||P|updatec/b/a(x2,∅).update//(xDL, T1).0] →
l2[ c[b[a[∅]] | b[a[∅]] | b[a[R]]] || P | update//(xDL, T1).0] →
l2[ c[b[T1] | b[T1] | b[a[R]]] || P].
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5.2. Insensitivity to higher level data terms
The security policy enforced by our typing system should not be confused with non-interference. A high level process
can easily declassify information of its security level to lower levels. However in the absence of high level processes, lower
level processes are insensitive even to the existence of higher level data.
Consider the following networks
N1 = lh[ T || P ]
and
N2 = lh[ T || P ] | mj[ T ′ || 0 ]
where h < j.
Then the following property holds
Proposition 5.1. For each N such that N2 _ N there is N′ such that N = N′ | mj[ T ′ || 0 ] and N1 _ N′.
Proof. We will give the proof by induction on_ . Let us suppose that:
N2 _ lh[ T1 || P1 ] | mj[ T ′ || 0 ] → N and N1 _ lh[ T1 || P1 ].
We have the following cases:
• P1 ≡ c¯Tv〈v〉 | cTv(z).P′ | Q and N′ ≡ lh[ T1 || P′{v/z} | Q ];
• P1 ≡ c¯Tv〈v〉 |!cTv(z).P′ | Q and N′ ≡ lh[ T1 || !cTv(z).P′ | P′{v/z} | Q ];
• P1 ≡ go lh.P′ | Q and N′ ≡ lh[ T1 || P′|Q ];
• P1 ≡ runp | Q and N′ ≡ lh[ T1 || P′1 | . . . | P′n | Q ];
• P1 ≡ updatep(χ, V).P′ | Q ′ and N′ ≡ lh[ T1 || P′s1 | . . . | P′sn | Q ′ ].
All these cases imply N1 _ N′ and N = N′ | mj[ T ′ || 0 ]. By the property P1 of Proposition 4.1 and the assumption h < j, the
case P1 ≡ go mj.P′ | Q is not possible. 
Another similar result is the following. Let N be a network all whose locations have security level less than or equal to h.
Let V, V ′ be data terms of security levels j, j′ > h, respectively. Then
Proposition 5.2. Under the above conditions we have N_ N′ if and only if N[V ′/V]_N′[V ′/V],whereN[V ′/V] is the network
obtained by replacing in N some occurrences of V in the leaves with V ′.
Proof. The proof is again by induction on_ . The only interesting cases is when a run or an update command is executed.
Let
N_ lh′ [ T || runp | Q ′ ] |N1 → lh′ [ T || P1 | . . . | Pn | Q ′ ] | N1
and
N[V ′/V]_ lh′ [ T[V ′/V] || runp | Q ′ ] | N1[V ′/V].
If V is a script it cannot be activated by property P4 of Proposition 4.1. So we get lh′ [ T[V ′/V] || runp | Q ′ ] | N1[V ′/V] →
lh
′ [ T[V ′/V] || P1 | . . . | Pn | Q ′ ] | N1[V ′/V].
Let
N_ lh′ [ T || updatep(χ, V0).P | Q ′ ]|N1 → lh′ [ T ′ || Ps1 | . . . | Psn | Q ′ ]|N1
and
N[V ′/V]_ lh′ [ T[V ′/V] || updatep(χ, V0).P | Q ′ ] |N1[V ′/V].
By properties P2 and P3 of Proposition 4.1 the security level of χ must be less than or equal to h. For this reason the
occurrences of the data term V in T can be neither modified nor copied and therefore
lh
′ [ T[V ′/V] || updatep(χ, V0).P | Q ′ ] | N1[V ′/V] → lh′ [ T ′[V ′/V] || Ps1 | . . . | Psn | Q ′ ] | N1[V ′/V]. 
5.3. Remote voting system
The next example models a remote voting for election of a leader from a given list of candidates, inspired by [13]. In this
example, we allow leaves to contain integers, in order to represent the counters of votes. A pattern too can be a variable of
type Integer and of a fixed security level.
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The network consists of an authority location, a polling station location and a fixed number of voter locations. The
authority location has level 3, while the polling station and all the voter locations have level 1.
The polling station location
station1[voterList[ . . . | voterId[ P ]| . . .] | candList[ T ] || 0 ],
where P = (νcPath)(cut• (x1).go voter1.b¯Ch(Path)〈cPath〉 | d¯Ch(Path)〈cPath〉) and T = . . . | name[ 02 ] | . . . , contains as data the
voter list and the candidate list with counters of votes.
The voter list has for each voter an edge labeled by the voter identifier pointing to the scripted process P of security
level 1. This script contains two processes. One process first destroys itself and then goes to the voter location, where it
communicates a secret channel which the voter will use to express his vote. The other process simply communicates the
same secret channel via the channel d.
The candidate list has for each candidate an edge labeled by the candidate name pointing to an integer (the vote counter,
initially 0) of security level 2. This assures that the voter can copy the subtree with candidate list and see candidate names,
but by property P2 of Proposition 4.1 he cannot see and use already recorded votes to make his decision.
A voter location contains two processes: the first process goes to the station and activates the process P and the second
one waits to receive a channel along which he will communicate his vote, after going to the station and making a choice
(based on the candidate list):
voter1[ . . . || go station1.runvoterList/voterId |
bCh(Path)(y).go station1.Choice(z).y¯〈z〉 | . . .].
The process in the authority location starts the elections by going to the station where he repeatedly collects one private
channel via the channel d, receives along this private channel one candidate name and increases by 1 the corresponding
candidate counter:
authority3[ Start[Q] | . . . || runStart | . . . ],
Q = go station1.!dPath(v).v(w).updatecandVoteList/w(t2, t + 1).
Similarly the authority can end the election going to the station and erasing the voter list.
Notice that a malicious voter cannot vote more than once, since the process P destroys itself, and if he would send
the identifier of another voter, the other voter would receive the secret channel to vote. Moreover by property P3 of
Proposition 4.1 a malicious voter cannot change the vote counters in the station location, since the vote counters have
security level 2, while the voters have security level 1.
A malicious voter can send to the location of another voter a process which votes in place of the voter itself. We do not
know how to avoid these kinds of attacks, which model a voter stealing the position of another voter during the voting act.
We cannot avoid this by giving incomparable security levels to the voter locations, since they allmust have the same security
level of the polling station in order to allow processes go from the polling station to the voter locations and vice versa.
The present encoding is simpler than the encoding of the same example given in [8].
5.4. Distributed library
Let us consider a network consisting of a distributed library (main library and libraries of specific fields), readers, staff
members and a head. The main library (Library) has data subtrees for management and catalogue. The library catalogue
contains in its leaves pointers to full books which are distributed in leaves of specific field libraries.
Library1 [ Management [ WorkingHours[HourPlan2] | . . . ] |
Catalog [ . . . | Pierce[Types[Pierce/Types@LICS1] |
Category[Pierce/Category@LICS1] . . .] |
| Cohn[Universal[Cohn/Universal@ALGEBRA1] | . . .]
|| . . .],
LICS1[ . . . | Pierce [ Types [ Book.pdf 1 ] | Category [ Book.pdf 1] | . . . ] || . . . ],
ALGEBRA1 [ . . . | . . . Cohn [ Universal [ Book.pdf 1 ] | . . . ] || . . . ].
For example, the reader
Reader1[Book[Pierce[∅] | . . . ] || go Library1.copyCatalog/Pierce/Types(y@x1).
go x.copyPierce/Types(z
1).go Reader1.pasteBook/Pierce〈Types[z]〉 ]
goes to the library, reads in the catalogue the location of the book, goes to the sublibrary, copies the book and pastes the
copy in the tree of his location.
The typing system introduced in the current paper assures that the reader can copy content of any book, but he cannot
modify it (property P3 of Proposition 4.1). Besides, he cannot see HourPlan in the management leaf, because he is of a lower
security level than the HourPlan (property P2 of Proposition 4.1).
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Table A.1
Structural equivalence
(trees) V ≡ V′ ⇒ a[V] ≡ a[V′]
(scripts) P ≡ P′ ⇒ P ≡ P′
(processes) (νcTv)0 ≡ 0
v ≡ v′ ⇒ c¯Tv〈v〉 ≡ c¯Tv〈v′〉
(νcTv)(νdTv
′
)P ≡ (νdTv′ )(νcTv)P
cTv 6∈ fn(P) ⇒ P | (νcTv)Q ≡ (νcTv)(P | Q)
V ≡ V′ ⇒ updatep(χ, V).P ≡ updatep(χ, V′).P
(networks) (νcTv)0 ≡ 0
(νcTv)(νdTv
′
)N ≡ (νdTv′ )(νcTv)N
cTv 6∈ fn(N) ⇒ N | (νcTv)N′ ≡ (νcTv)(N | N′)
T ≡ T′ ∧ P ≡ P′ ⇒ lh[ T ‖ P ] ≡ lh[ T′ ‖ P′ ]
cTv 6∈ fn(T) ⇒ lh[ T ‖ (νcTv)P ] ≡ (νcTv)lh[ T ‖ P ]
The staff is given security level 2, such that they can update catalogue, modify the book contents, but only copy the
HourPlan.
The head, being of security level 3, is the only one that can update all the data at the Library. He can, for example, change
working hours.
6. Conclusion
We have discussed a typed version of the Xdpi calculus in which the access to resources and the mobility of processes
must respect a security policy. Since we used a typed pattern matching which includes a dynamic type checking, we will
investigate both type checking and type inference for this calculus, taking into account [7].
An obvious alternative approach is to tag active processes syntactically with their security levels. Initial networks must
only have active processes tagged with levels at most equal to the levels of their containing locations. In this way one gains
in flexibility since processes in the same location can have different security levels. The price to pay is a heavier syntax.
More expressivity could be achieved by associating security levels to tree branches. We leave the study of this variation
as future work.
We plan to investigate modifications of our type system which prevent illegal flow of information [18], also in presence
of dynamic flow policies [22].
We want to study the impact of our typing system in proving equivalence of networks, using different notions of
behavioural equivalence. We plan to start from the untyped equivalences defined in [14,9], and to refine them using types
as done for example in [17,12].
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Appendix A. Structural equivalence
The structural equivalence for the Xdpi calculus is the least equivalence relation on networks that satisfies alpha-
conversion, the commutative monoid properties for (∅, | ) on trees, for (0, | ) on processes and for (0, | ) on networks,
and the axioms of Table A.1. As usual fn is the set of free channel names occurring in a process or in a tree or in a network.
Appendix B. Subject reduction
We prove that the typing of networks is preserved by structural equivalence and by reduction. These proofs use
generation lemmas which allow the reversal of the typing rules. Notice that for networks we need to distinguish initial and
ongoing typing rules.
We use τ to range over all types of Table 9.
Lemma B.1 (Generation Lemma for Variables, Channels, Locations and Paths).
(1) Σ ` x : τ ⇒ x : τ ∈ Σ .
(2) Σ ` cTv : τ ⇒ τ = Ch(Tv).
(3) Σ ` li : τ ⇒ τ = Loc(i).
(4) Σ ` p : τ and p is a local path⇒ τ = PathLocal.
(5) Σ ` p : τ and p is not a local path⇒ τ = Path?.
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Lemma B.2 (Generation Lemma for Scripts, Pointers and Trees).
(1) Σ ` Π : τ ⇒ τ = Script(i) and Σ ` Π : Proc?(i).
(2) Σ ` p@λ : τ ⇒ τ = Pointer?(i) and Σ ` λ : Loc(i) and Σ ` p : Path?.
(3) Σ ` ∅ : τ ⇒ either τ = DLTree or τ = Tree?.
(4) Σ ` T1 | T2 : τ ⇒ either τ = DLTree and Σ ` T1 : DLTree and Σ ` T2 : DLTree or τ = Tree? and Σ ` T1 : Tree? and
Σ ` T2 : Tree?.
(5) Σ ` a[T] : τ ⇒ either τ = DLTree and Σ ` T : DLTree or τ = Tree? and Σ ` T : Tree?.
(6) Σ ` a[p@λ] : τ ⇒ τ = Tree? and Σ ` p@λ : Pointer?(i).
(7) Σ ` a[Π ] : τ ⇒ τ = Tree? and Σ ` Π : Script(i).
Lemma B.3 (Generation Lemma for Processes).
(1) Σ ` 0 : τ ⇒ τ = Proc?(i).
(2) Σ ` P1 | P2 : τ ⇒ τ = Proc?(i) and Σ ` P1 : Proc?(i) and Σ ` P2 : Proc?(i).
(3) Σ ` (νcTv)P : τ ⇒ τ = Proc?(i) and Σ ` P : Proc?(i) and |Tv| ≤ i.
(4) Σ ` γ¯〈v〉 : τ ⇒ τ = Proc?(i) and Σ ` v : Tv and Σ ` γ : Ch(Tv) and |Tv| ≤ i.
(5) Σ ` γ(x).P : τ ⇒ τ = Proc?(i) and Σ, x : Tv ` P : Proc?(i) and Σ ` γ : Ch(Tv) and |Tv| ≤ i.
(6) Σ ` !γ(x).P : τ ⇒ τ = Proc?(i) and Σ, x : Tv ` P : Proc?(i) and Σ ` γ : Ch(Tv) and |Tv| ≤ i.
(7) Σ ` goλ.P : τ ⇒ τ = Proc?(i) and ` λ : Loc(j) and j ≤ i and Σ ` P : Proc?(i).
(8) Σ ` go 	.P : τ ⇒ τ = ProcLocal(i) and Σ ` P : Proc?(i).
(9) Σ ` runp : τ ⇒ τ = Proc?(i) and Σ ` p : Path?.
(10) Σ ` updatep(χ, χˆ).P : τ ⇒ τ = Proc?(i) and Σ ` p : Path? and Σ ∪ Σχ ` P : Proc?(i) and |χ| ≤ i.
(11) Σ ` updatep(χ, V).P : τ and χ 6= x and V 6= χˆ and (p 6=• or χ 6= xj for all j) ⇒ τ = Proc?(i) and Σ ` p : Path? and
Σ ∪ Σχ ` P : Proc?(i) and |χ| < i and Σχ ` V : TPS(j) and j ≤ i.
(12) Σ ` update• (xi, V).P : τ ⇒ τ = ProcLocal(i) and Σ, x : ProcLocal(i) ` P : ProcLocal(i) and x : ProcLocal(i) ` V :
TPS(j) and j ≤ i.
Lemma B.4 (Generation Lemma for Networks).
(1) ` 0 : τ ⇒ τ = Net.
(2) ` N1 | N2 : τ ⇒ τ = Net and ` N1 : Net and ` N2 : Net andN (N1) ∩N (N2) = ∅.
(3) ` li[ T ‖ P ] : τ ⇒ τ = Net and ∅ ` T : Tree and
• either (initial) ∅ ` P : Proc(i),
• or (ongoing) ∅ ` P : Proc(j).
(3) ` (νcTv)N : τ ⇒ τ = Net and ` N : Net.
The following two propositions point out some properties of our type system and can be easily verified by induction of
deductions.
By replacing in an arbitrary process “	" by a location name (whose security level agrees with that of the process) and “• ”
by a path not containing “• ” we get a process typeable with a process type.
Proposition B.5. If Σ ` P : Proc?(i) and Σ ` p : Path and j ≤ i, then Σ ` P{lj/	, p/• } : Proc(i).
A process which has a given security level has also all bigger security levels. The proof follows easily observing that the nil
process can be typedwith an arbitrary security level and that all typing rules only check that the security level of the current
process is bigger than other security levels.
Proposition B.6. Σ ` P : Proc?(i) and i ≤ j imply Σ ` P : Proc?(j).
As usual the “core” of the subject reduction proofs are substitution lemmas.
Lemma B.7 (Substitution Lemma for Trees, Pointers, Scripts and Processes).
(1) If Σ, x : Tv ` V : TPS(i) and Σ ` v : Tv, then Σ ` V{v/x} : TPS(i).
(2) If Σ, x : ProcLocal(j) ` V : TPS(i) and Σ ` P : ProcLocal(j), then Σ ` V{P/x} : TPS(i).
(3) If Σ, x : Tv ` P : Proc?(i) and Σ ` v : Tv, then Σ ` P{v/x} : Proc?(i).
(4) If Σ, x : ProcLocal(j) ` P : Proc?(i) and Σ ` Q : ProcLocal(j), then Σ ` P{Q/x} : Proc?(i).
(5) If Σ ` updatep(χ, V).P : Proc(i) and Σ ` T : Tree and p(T) p,li,χ,V T ′,Θ , then Σ ` T ′ : Tree.
Proof. The proofs of the first four points are standard by induction on V and P, respectively.
For (5) we need to consider three cases according to the shape of χ. We give the proof for χ = y?@xj, the remaining
cases being similar. Let Θ = {s1, . . . , sn} and 1 ≤ k ≤ n. By construction sk = {mj/x, p′k/y}, for some mj and p′k such that` p′k : Path?. By Lemma B.3(10) or (11) Σ, x : Loc(j), y : Path? ` V : TPS(h) for some h ≤ i. By Point (1) Σ ` Vsk : TPS(h). By
construction T ′ is obtained from T by replacing top-down the nodesmj@p′k by Vsk, so we can easily check that Σ ` T ′ : Tree
using the typing rules for trees. 
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Theorem 3.1 (Subject Reduction). Let ` N : Net and N → N′, then ` N′ : Net.
Proof. We only consider some interesting cases.
Case N ≡ lh[ T1 || go mj.P | Q ] | mj[ T2 || R ] and the reduction is by rule (go):
lh[ T1 || go mj.P | Q ] | mj[ T2 || R ] → lh[ T1 || Q ] | mj[ T2 || P | R ].
From ` N : Net, by Lemma B.4(2) it follows that ` N1 ≡ lh[ T1 || go mj.P | Q ] : Net and ` N2 ≡ mj[ T2 || R ] : Net. From
N1 : Net, by Lemma B.4(3) we get ∅ ` T1 : Tree and
• either (initial) ∅ ` go mj.P | Q : Proc(h);
• or (ongoing) ∅ ` go mj.P | Q : Proc(i).
We consider the ongoing case, the proof for the initial case being the same. In this case by Lemma B.3(2) we have that
∅ ` go mj.P : Proc(i) and then by Lemma B.3(7) ∅ ` P : Proc(i). We conclude by applying the ongoing typing rules taking
into account Proposition B.6.
Case N ≡ lh[ T || runp | Q] and the reduction is by rule (run):
lh[ T || runp | Q] → lh[ T || P1 | . . . | Pn | Q]
where p(T)  p,lh,xh,x T, {{P1/x}, . . . , {Pn/x}}. From ` N : Net, by Lemma B.4(3) ∅ ` T : Tree. By construction
Pk = P′k{lh/	, p/• }, whereP′k matchesxh and therefore ∅ ` P′k : ProcLocal(h) and then ∅ ` Pk : Proc(h) by Proposition B.5.
We conclude by applying the ongoing typing rules taking into account Proposition B.6.
Case N ≡ lh[ T || updatep(χ, V).P | Q] and the reduction is by rule (update):
lh[ T || updatep(χ, V).P | Q] → lh[ T ′ || Ps1 | . . . | Psn | Q]
where p(T) p,lh,χ,V T ′, {s1, . . . ,sn}. From ` N : Net, by Lemma B.4(3) ∅ ` T : Tree and
• either (initial) ∅ ` updatep(χ, V).P | Q : Proc(h),
• or (ongoing) ∅ ` updatep(χ, V).P | Q : Proc(i).
We consider the ongoing case with χ = y?@xj, the proof for the other cases being similar. In this case by Lemma B.7(5)
∅ ` T ′ : Tree. By Lemma B.3(2) we have that ∅ ` updatep(χ, V).P : Proc(i) and then by Lemma B.3(10) or (11)
x : Loc(j), y : Path? ` P : Proc(i). By construction sk = {mj/x, p′k/y}, for some mj and p′k such that ` p′k : Path?. By
Lemma B.7(3) this gives ∅ ` Psk : Proc(i). We conclude by applying the ongoing typing rules for processes. 
Appendix C. Safety proof
Proposition 4.2 If N is an initial network, and N _ Eν(li[ T || P | Q ] | N′), and h is the security level of the source location of P,
then ` P : Proc(h).
Proof. The proof is by induction on_ and by cases on the definition of source location using Generation and Substitution
Lemmas.
Case N ≡ Eν(li[ T || P | Q ] | N′). In this case i = h and ` N : Net using the initial typing rules. By Lemma B.4(4), (2), (3)
` P | Q : Proc(h)which implies ` P : Proc(h) by Lemma B.3(2).
Case N _ Eν(lh[ T || runp | Q ′ ] | N′) → Eν(lh[ T || P | Q ] | N′) since p(T)  p,lh,xh,x T, {{R1/x}, . . . , {Rn/x}} and R1 ≡
P | R and Q ≡ R | R2 | . . . | Rn | Q ′. Then p(T) p,lh,xh,x T, {{R1/x}, . . . , {Rn/x}} implies match(R′1,xh) = {R1/x}
and R1 ≡ R′1{lh/	, p1/.} for some R′1, p1 such that ` R′1 : ProcLocal(h) and p1 is a path without occurrences of “.”. Then` p1 : Pathwhich together with ` R′1 : ProcLocal(h) imply ` R1 : Proc(h) by Proposition B.5. So we conclude ` P : Proc(h) by
Lemma B.3(2).
Case N _ Eν(li[ T ′ || updatep(y?@xj, V).P′ | Q ′ ] | N′) → Eν(li[ T || P | Q ] | N′) since p(T ′)  p,li,y?@xj,V T, {s1, . . . ,sn}
and P′s1 ≡ P | R and Q ≡ R | P′s2 | . . . |P′sn | Q ′. By induction we have that ∅ ` updatep(χ, V).P : Proc(h) and then
by Lemma B.3(10) or (11) x : Loc(j), y : Path? ` P : Proc(h). By construction sk = {mj/x, p′k/y}, for some mj, p′k such that` p′k : Path?. By Lemma B.7(3) this gives ∅ ` Psk : Proc(h).
The proofs for the remaining cases are similar to the proof of the last case. 
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